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Abstract
We examine how physical abilities aect individuals' preferences. In par-
ticular, by incorporating social comparison into prospect theory, we directly
estimate the degree of loss aversion from social comparison, a concept we term
`ALJ' (Avoiding Loss relative to the Joneses). Our main ndings are as fol-
lows: (i) the participants who choose the physical education as the best subject
exhibit a greater degree of ALJ than others; (ii) physical tness inuences the
degree of ALJ; (iii) gender inuences social comparison preferences; (iv) partic-
ipants with a greater degree of ALJ do not respond to voluntary questionnaire;
(v) the form of participants' ALJ is aected by the voluntary behavior of their
parents. A comparison of ALJ with loss aversion in the original prospect the-
ory reveals that they have dierent characteristics.
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1 Introduction
Sport psychologists and behavioral scientists investigating a rich range of sports
and cultural pastimes are increasingly using experimental models to gain theoretical
insights into decision-making processes and actions in human behavioral systems
(e.g., Tenenbaum and Eklund (2007), Davids et al (2002) and Davids et al (2005)),
leading to many interesting conclusions. The present paper uses data on physical
tness, such as exibility, strength, agility and speed, to examine the relationship
between physical tness, the surrounding environment in terms of motor abilities
and individual preferences including loss aversion.
Loss aversion is an important element of individuals' preferences, showing that a
one-dollar loss, from an initial reference position of zero own gain{loss, has a greater
absolute eect on individual happiness than a one-dollar gain. Many articles based
on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) have oered evidence about loss
aversion preference. The concept enables us to explain the large disparity often
observed between the minimal amount that people are willing to accept (WTA) to
give up a good and the maximal amount they would be willing to pay (WTP) to
acquire it. In the original prospect theory, as well as in traditional economic theory,
individuals act exclusively out of self-interest and maximize utility that depends on
their own absolute consumption or income levels. Since Max Weber's work, it has
also been well known that social comparison plays an important role in individual
choices. As part of the striking development of neuroeconomics, Fliessbach et al
(2007) and Dohmen et al (2011a) provide evidence about the neurophysiological
foundations of relative income using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
techniques. Their common nding is that not only the absolute income but also
the relative one inuence reward-related brain activity. Many happiness studies in
experimental elds examine the relation between individuals' happiness and that of
others. Recent theoretical contributions incorporate social comparison by assuming
that individuals care not only about their own consumption or income level but also
about their society's average level (e.g., Abel (1990) and Dupor and Liu (2004)).
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The existing literature suggests that social comparison is a fundamental compo-
nent of human behavior. In this paper, we assume that individuals compare their
own gains and losses with those of others and extend prospect theory by incorpo-
rating this assumption. This implies that an individual feels loss if his or her gain
is less than that of another, an insight that we incorporate into prospect theory.
We directly estimate the loss aversion parameter including social comparison using
switching analysis.1 To distinguish between the loss aversion in the original prospect
theory and that in our model, we term loss aversion with social comparison Avoiding
Loss relative to the Joneses (ALJ).2
In addition to the preferences parameters, we focus on personal physical tness
and various components connected to ability. We have two reasons for this. First,
it has long been known that physical and mental ability are extremely closely re-
lated, as shown in the considerable number of articles in the elds of medicine and
psychology examining the psychological eects of physical tness and physical ac-
tivity. For example, physical activity and exercise are believed to alleviate some
of the symptoms associated with mild to moderate depression and positively aect
mental health. The evidence also suggests that physical activity and exercise might
provide a benecial adjunct to alcoholism and substance abuse programs, which im-
prove self-image, condence, well-being, sexual satisfaction, social skills and cognitive
functioning and reduce the symptoms of anxiety.3 Furthermore, in sport and health
psychology, many studies have examined the eects of sports and motor abilities on
personality, concluding that motor abilities, sports and exercise aect personality
1For example, using switching analysis, Holt and Laury (2002) estimate the risk aversion pa-
rameter of the neoclassical utility function, while Tanaka et al (2010) and Liu (2011) estimate a
loss aversion parameter as well as the risk aversion parameter in the original prospect theory.
2We make use of Keeping Up with the Joneses (KUJ) and Running Away from the Joneses
(RAJ), which are used in other social comparison articles (e.g., Abel (1990) and Dupor and Liu
(2003)).
3Green et al (2004) write about the mental health of children and adolescents and Biddle and
Mutrie (2007) comprehensively examine the psychological eects of physical activity.
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through the relationship between coaches and athletes, social climate, match com-
petition and the presence of spectators at matches. It has been acknowledged that
athletes enjoy mental stability and have a low degree of neurotic inclination with
high self-esteem. For example, Sonstroem and Morgan (1989) explain the positive
eect of physical exercise on self-esteem in their exercise and self-esteem model.4
Second, we believe there is a relationship among preferences with social compar-
ison, motor performance and competition. Competition is a human social behavior
because our society is stimulated by the existence of others. People frequently engage
in competition through sport. In particular, when the motor abilities of participants
are measured in a class, the participants seem to be conscious of others in the class,
which implies that motor performance may be aected according to the degree of
participants' consciousness of others. If this is the case, we presume that motor per-
formance is related to the degree of social comparison preferences. In addition, we
focus on gender dierences, because it is well known that competitive behavior and
gender are closely related.5 Hence, we are interested in whether gender aects the
degree of ALJ.6
The above relationships are expected to be observed especially in the young be-
cause children have a greater tendency than adults to reveal a sense of emulation
in simple competitions such as a 50 m dash, an endurance run and the long jump.
In Japan's highly developed education system, the data on teenagers' motor per-
formance are rich; nevertheless, it appears that using these data, the impacts on
preferences have not yet been adequately analyzed, even though they constitute a
suitable source for observing the potential relationship between social comparison
and certain factors. Hence, we use the data on physical tness collected by the Min-
istry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which studies
the motor abilities of adolescents. Our data for the current paper cover 111 students
4See Sonstroem et al (1993), Sonstroem et al (1994) and Marsh and Sonstroem (1995)
5For example, see Gneezy and Rustinichini (2004) and Gneezy et al (2009).
6As far as we know, the relation between gender and loss aversion in the original prospect theory
has not been observed. See Tanaka et al (2010) and Liu (2011).
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aged 12{13 years, at Hetsugi Junior High School. The data include the degrees of
agility, endurance, speed, muscular strength and exibility. The students were also
requested to voluntarily answer questions about their lifestyle, such as bedtime and
hours of study. 73 students from Hetsugi Junior High School voluntarily answered
the questions. In our experiment, we also asked whole participants (111 students)
related to motor abilities: whether or not they do sport as their club activity, and
whether or not they consider physical education to be their best subject.
In the current paper, we mainly examine the following three points. First, we in-
vestigate whether the degree of ALJ diers from loss aversion in the original prospect
theory.7 Second, we examine whether personal physical tness and some components
related to physical tness aect ALJ. Third, we discuss the characteristics of those
who participated in voluntary questionnaire and examine the relationship between
parents' behavior and that of their children.
Our main ndings are as follows. (i) The participants who choose the physi-
cal education as the best subject exhibit a greater degree of ALJ than the others
(ii) Some types of physical tness have an impact on the degree of ALJ, whereas
those do not have an impact on loss aversion without social comparison. (iii) Gen-
der largely inuences preferences with social comparison, whereas it only slightly
inuences preferences taking no account of social comparison. (iv) Participants who
exhibit a higher degree of ALJ tended not to respond to the voluntary questionnaire.
(v) Participants' ALJ was related to parents' attitudes, as reected in parents' will-
ingness to complete a voluntary questionnaire; however, their loss aversion was not
related.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
theoretical basis for our paper and presents an example of the dierence between our
theory and the original prospect theory. Section 3 examines the dierence between
ALJ and loss aversion, and the eects of physical tness on these preferences. Section
4 makes further researches using our data. Section 5 concludes.
7The detailed procedure for the experiments is given in Section 3.
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2 The related literature
In the experimental eld, there are some papers which are closely related to this pa-
per. Tanaka et al (2010) and Liu (2011) conducted an experiment to elicit individual
risk and loss preferences directly using switching analysis. In their experiments, the
reference point is dened as an own gain{loss of zero using the original prospect the-
ory. Tanaka et al (2010), who were the rst to apply switching analysis in prospect
theory, conclude that in villages with higher mean income, people are less loss averse;
however, own household income is not correlated with the degree of loss aversion.
Liu (2011) examines how risk and loss attitudes aect farm technology adoption de-
cisions in China, nding that farmers with higher risk aversion or higher loss aversion
adopt Bt cotton later.
Pore and Schweitzer (2011) directly interlink sporting performance and loss aver-
sion using data from the PGA Tour, which tests for whether professional golfers' pref-
erences show loss aversion. They demonstrate that professional golfers|including
the best golfers such as Tiger Woods|hit birdie putts less accurately than they hit
otherwise similar par putts, concluding that their preferences reect loss aversion
when the reference point is dened by par. Chiteji (2010) and Dohmen et al (2010)
pay attention to cognitive and noncognitive abilities rather than physical abilities.
Chiteji (2010) examines the relationship between individuals' health behavior and
the \noncognitive" skills that are dened as the degree to which an individual is
future-oriented and self-ecacious. It concludes that these skills are positively re-
lated to good health behaviors. Dohmen et al (2010) examine the relation between
cognitive ability and risk aversion. They nd that lower cognitive ability is associated
with a greater level of risk aversion and more pronounced impatience.
Another strand of related literature considers gender dierences and preferences.8
Because individuals care about those with whom they are competing, social prefer-
ences and competition are related; therefore, we presume that the preferences with
8See the detailed review of the relation between gender dierences and preferences in Croson
and Gneezy (2009).
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social comparison and gender dierences are closely related.9 This is because it has
been well-known that gender aects competitive behavior. Gneezy and Rustichini
(2004) use data on physical education of participants aged 9{10 to examine the re-
lationship between gender and competition, and conclude that males attempt to
play with many partners and compete with other males rather than with females.10
Gneezy et al (2009) show that the surrounding environment is important for the link
between gender and competition. They conclude that Maasai men opt to compete
at roughly twice the rate as Maasai women, a nding that is consistent with those
of other papers. The pattern is reversed among the Khasai, noting that the Maasai
is a patriarchal society and the Khasai is matrilineal.
3 The model
3.1 Loss aversion with or without social comparison
The empirical prediction from the loss aversion hypothesis in existing studies, in-
cluding Kahneman and Tversky (1979), is that a loss of one dollar, from the initial
reference position of a zero own gain{loss, has a greater absolute eect on individual
happiness than a gain of one dollar. In contrast to the initial reference point of a
zero own gain{loss, taking into account social comparison under which individuals
care about, and respond to, another's gain, we assume that individuals are concerned
with own gain{loss relative to another's gain{loss. This means that an individual
feels loss if his or her gain is lower than this other's gain, even when own gain is
obtained. We call this loss aversion with social comparison Avoiding Loss relative to
the Joneses (ALJ).
We incorporate social comparison into the basic equation of prospect theory given
9In the case of preferences without social comparison, Tanaka et al (2010) and Liu (2011)
conclude that gender does not aect the degree of loss aversion.
10In addition, Gneezy et al (2003) examine the relation between gender and competition in a
winner-takes-all scheme.
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in a series of papers by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Tversky and Kahneman
(1992). When a set of consequences are simply assumed to be monetary outcomes,
we assume that one receives x1 with probability p and x2 with probability 1  p, in
which xi(> 0) (i = 1; 2) are a set of money prizes with associated probabilities p and
1  p.
Under a typical prospect that xi > Xothers > xj where i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j,
prospect theory with social comparison reduces to an expected valuation expression
as in the original prospect theory:11
V (xijXothers) = (p)v(x1jXothers) + (1  p)v(x2jXothers); i = 1; 2: (1a)
v(xijXothers) (i = 1; 2) is the subjective value of the outcome xi and Xothers is a
reference point given by another's monetary prize. Probabilities are weighted by a
nonlinear probability weighting function () with (0) = 0 and (1) = 1.
Alternatively, when xi > xj > Xothers or Xothers > xi > xj where i; j = 1; 2 and
i 6= j, the subjective value is specied as:
V (xijXothers) = v(x2jXothers) + (p)[v(x1jXothers)  v(x2jXothers)]; i = 1; 2: (1b)
From the general forms of our model in (1a) and (1b), we note the following three
points. First, the original formulation of prospect theory allows for dierent curva-
ture for the domain of own losses and of own gains. Instead, our model implies that
the reference point given by another's monetary prize Xothers separates the domain
of losses from that of gains. Hence, the curvature diers according to whether or not
an individual's monetary prize is greater than the other's gain. Second, if the curva-
tures given by the domains of losses and gains are the same, our model might reduce
11A more general form is:
V (xijXothers;i) = (p)v(x1jXothers;1) + (1  p)v(x2jXothers;2); i = 1; 2:
That is, the other's monetary prize also changes under respective prospects; however, as depicted
in our experimental design, we assume that the other's monetary prizes are the same under both
prospects 1 and 2.
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to a kind of expected utility model with social comparison. Following the taxonomy
given by Abel (1990) and Gal (1994), the reduced form of our model would be the
well-known Keeping (Catching) Up with the Joneses. We return to this later, when
specifying the utility function. Third, if we assume that (p) + (1   p) = 1, we
show that the expressions (1a) and (1b) are the same as those in the original prospect
theory.12
We now specify the subjective value v(xijXothers). Drawing on many studies that
deal with social comparison, a standard subjective value is given by a piecewise power
function v(xijXothers) = (xi   Xothers)1  where  is the degree of social comparison
and  is the risk aversion parameter. Similar value functions have been used in the
context of asset pricing (Abel 1990 and Gal 1994), growth models (Corneo and
Jeanne 1997, Futagami and Shibata 1998), foundations of microeconomics (Clark
and Oswald 1998), tax policy (Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000) and equilibrium eciency
(Liu and Turnovsky 2005, Nakamoto 2009).13 In the current paper, for tractability,
we assume that the sign of  is positive, implying that the external impact of an
increase in another's monetary prize is negative @v(xijXothers)
@Xothers
< 0, which exhibits
Keeping Up with the Joneses.14 In addition, we simply assume that  = 1.15 Hence,
in our model, xi  Xothers is the domain of gains, while xi < Xothers is the domain of
losses.
12Because the equation (1b) is rewritten as V (xijXothers) = (p)v(x1jXothers) + (1  
(p))v(x2jXothers) (i = 1; 2) using (p) + (1   p) = 1, we show that the equations (1a) and
(1b) are the same.
13In addition to the piecewise power function, a popular value function incorporating social
comparison is an iso-elastic form function: v(xijXothers) = (xiXothers)1  =
h
x1 i

Xothers
xi
i1 
.
14In contrast to the sign restriction, when @v(xijXothers)@Xothers > 0; preferences exhibit Running Away
from the Joneses.
15This assumption allows us to reduce the number of questions that specify the preferences'
parameters. In the next section, we present our experimental design.
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The simple piecewise power function used in the current paper is:
v(xijXothers) =
8><>:(xi  Xothers)
1  if xi  Xothers
  [  (xi  Xothers)]1  if xi < Xothers
; (2)
where (> 0) is the value of ALJ and  is the risk aversion parameter. The value of
ALJ, , means that a higher value of ALJ indicates stronger ALJ. Where  > 1, the
value function is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain. In addition,
because  6= 1, the function (2) has a kink around the reference point given by the
other's monetary prize Xothers. Next, the form of the risk aversion parameter implies
risk loving for  < 0, risk neutrality for  = 0 and risk aversion for  > 0. Assuming
that the values of risk aversion  are the same in the loss as in the gain domain, the
utility for losses is just the negative reection of the utility for gains, scaled down by
. In particular, assuming that jy Xothersj = jz Xothersj and y > Xothers > z(> 0),
the reection is exhibited in the sense that:
v(zjXothers) =  v(yjXothers); (3)
where y and z are own monetary prize. Thus, when  is greater than unity, the loss
of utility associated with giving up a valued good relative to another is greater than
the utility gain associated with receiving it.
We now compare our model with the original prospect theory, which is useful
for understanding the intuitions in the next section. The only dierence between
these models is the specication of the reference point. That is, our model faithfully
reduces to the original prospect theory when the reference point is given by self status
quo instead of another's monetary prize. In this case, the value function W (xi) in
the original prospect theory is:
W (xi) =
8><>:(p)w(x1) + (1  p)w(x2); if sign (x1) =  sign (x2)v(x2) + (p)[w(x1)  w(x2)]; if sign (x1) = sign (x2) ; (4)
where the piecewise subjective function is:
w(xi) =
8><>:(xi)
1  if xi  0
  [  (xi)]1  if xi < 0
: (5)
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Note that  is the risk aversion parameter and  is the loss aversion parameter.
Hence, the reection eect is:
w( y) =  w(y): (6)
Finally, following earlier studies (e.g., Tanaka et al (2010), Liu (2011)), the non-
linear probability weighting function is specied by:
(p) = exp( ( lnp)); (7)
where  is a parameter that determines whether or not the form of the value function
is a well-known inverted S-shaped value function. If  < 1, then (p) has an inverted
S-shape, implying that consumers overvalue low probabilities of large gains or losses
and undervalue high probabilities. However, if  = 1, the function (p) becomes
linear. Hence, the functional form given by (1a) and (1b) reduces to the expected
utility function or a specied utility functional form.
3.2 An example of loss aversion and ALJ
This subsection considers a series of choice problems to conrm the reection prop-
erty shown by (3) and (6), indicating that the decision may be changed by adding
another's participation. Because we want to focus only on the reection eect, we
initially restrict the risk attitude by assuming  =  = 0, which implies that an
individual is risk neutral. Hence, the utility functions (2) and (5) become linear. In
this simple setting, we consider the following choice problem:
Choice problem: Choose between
Choice A: $8(=x1) with p $6(=x2) with 1  p
Choice B: $10(=x1) with p $4(=x2) with 1  p
In this choice problem, the expected value of Choice A is that EVA = 8p+6(1 p) =
2p+ 6, while that of Choice B is that EVB = 10p+ 4(1  p) = 6p+ 4. For instance,
if the probability is given by p = 0:5, the respective expected values are both 7.
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Case 1: Assume that the reference point is given by a zero own gain{loss. In the
above-mentioned choice problem, the individual always gains regardless of whether
A or B is chosen so the reection eect in (6) is not produced. If he or she chooses
Choice B, the decision implies:
v(6) + (p)[v(8)  v(6)] < v(4) + (p)[v(10)  v(4)]
, v(6)  v(4)
v(10) + v(6)  v(8)  v(4) < (p)
, 0:5 < (p): (8)
The inequality (8) means that Choice B is selected if (p) is greater than 0.5.
Case 2: Let us consider that the individual's friend participates in this game
and always obtains a certain gain Xothers(> 0) irrespective of the choice of A or B.
We assume that the risk-neutral individual cares about the friend so that his or her
preference follows our model specication (1a) and (1b). We consider the case that
the certain gain of the friend is less than any monetary prize in the choice problem.
That is, $4 > Xothers. Hence, the individual's decision rule in this case would not be
changed relative to that in Case 1 because the individual's monetary prize is equally
scaled down by Xothers:
v(6jXothers)+(p)[v(8jXothers) v(6jXothers)] < v(4jXothers)+(p)[v(10jXothers) v(4jXothers)]
, v(6jXothers)  v(4jXothers)
v(10jXothers) + v(6jXothers)  v(8jXothers)  v(4jXothers) < (p)
, 0:5 < (p): (9)
Case 3: Suppose that Xothers = $5 to conrm how the ALJ parameter  inu-
ences the individual's decision. If he or she chooses Choice B as in Cases 1 and 2,
using (3) we can show that:
v(6j5) + (p)[v(8j5)  v(6j5)] < (p)v(10j5) + (1  p)v(4j5)
, v(6j5) < (p) [v(10j5)  v(8j5) + v(6j5)]  (1  p)v(6j5)
, 1 < 3(p)  (1  p): (10)
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Note that (> 0) indicates the degree of ALJ.
Before proceeding to the analysis of Case 3, we assume that  = 1 in (7) so
that the shape of the probability function is linear (i.e., (p) = p). Furthermore, we
assume that p = 0:501. In the choice problem, Choice A shows that the individual
obtains $8 with 50:1% and $6 with 49:9%, while with Choice B, he or she obtains
$10 with 50:1% and $4 with 49:9%. Hence, in both Cases 1 and 2, the individual
prefers Choice B to Choice A.
Alternatively, the individual may select Choice B in Case 3, rather than Choice
A. The equation (10) can be rewritten as:
 <
3 0:501  1
0:499
=
0:503
0:499
 1:008016: (11a)
As easily conrmed in (11a), the individual prefers Choice B to Choice A if  <
1:008016, which is the same with those in Cases 1 and 2; however, if  > 1:008016,
the individual chooses Choice A, which is safer than Choice B. Furthermore, when
the certain gain of the friend increases by $7, the lower degree of ALJ causes a change
in his or her decision:
 <
0:501
0:499
 1:004008: (11b)
From these cases, we infer that even if an individual selects a risky choice without
another, he or she may change the decision from the risky choice to a safe choice
when another exists.
4 Empirical study
4.1 Research design
The participants in our analysis are rst-year students at Hetsugi Junior High School
in Oita Prefecture, Japan, aged 12{13 years. The total number of students was
115, but four students were absent during our experiment. Hence, our data include
responses from 111 students, comprising 69 boys and 42 girls. The data were collected
at the school in June and December 2010.
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In June 2010, the motor ability tests were conducted. These were the 50 m dash,
20 m shuttle dash, standing long jump, grasping power, sidesteps, sit & up and sit
& reach. These items are a long-established Japanese standard for measuring junior
high school students' motor abilities. By using these data, which were collected
according to the methods of Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science
and Technology (MEXT), we obtained data on physical tness for agility, speed,
endurance, muscular strength and exibility. For example, from the 20 m shuttle
dash data, we can conrm the degree of endurance because students repeatedly run
between two lines 20 m apart for a given time until they give up, so that the more
rounds run, the greater is the student's endurance. The sit & up and sit & reach tests
enable us to measure the degree of exibility. Sit & up measures participants' ability
to lift themselves up from a position lying face down on the oor, while sit & reach
tests anteexion.16 Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics comparing the results
for Hetsugi Junior High School students with the national average for Japanese 12-
year-olds.17 Figure 1 shows the height and weight distributions of our participants.
In addition to the physical tests, the students were invited to voluntarily answer
questions about their lifestyle, such as bedtime and hours of study. Of our sample,
73 students answered these questions.
In December 2010, we administered further questions and exercises to the same
students at Hetsugi Junior High School to estimate the parameters of ALJ as well as
loss aversion in the original prospect theory. Our experiment began at approximately
2 pm, and lasted four hours.
We constructed our full dataset in four stages. In the initial and nal sessions,
we adopted essentially the same method as the switching analysis of Tanaka et al
(2010) and Liu (2011) in order to estimate the preferences' parameters directly. (i)
Participants answered questions relating to their degree of loss aversion by selecting
Choice A or Choice B for each lottery choice; in this initial session, we did not give
16Detailed explanations are available on the MEXT homepage at:
www.mext.go.jp/a menu/sports/stamina/05030101/001.pdf
17We use the latest data, for 2009, released by MEXT.
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any information about anyone else's gain dened as the reference point. The left
panel of Table 2 indicates the summary questions in the initial session. Hence, the
switching analysis in the initial session essentially follows Tanaka et al (2010) and Liu
(2011); however, because, in our experiment, the participants were young and the
sample size was large, we carefully explained to them the content and intent of the
survey experiments, with the help of six teachers and two assistants. Furthermore,
we contrived games about the switching analysis, using illustrations and the tools
described below, to ensure that, as much as possible, our questions were correctly
understood. First, we prepared booklets for each of our games and gave each student
a booklet for each game. As shown in Figure 2, each pair of facing pages includes one
question; Choice A is on the left page and Choice B is on the right page, along with
circles labeled Y, G and P, indicating a yellow, green or pink ball. The participants
circle their preferred Choice A or B. After drawing their circles, the participants wait
in silence, and then simultaneously turn the page on our instruction. Second, we use
a total of 10 balls with yellow, pink or green color. For example, in Figure 2 we
have two yellow balls, six pink balls and two green balls. The role of the pink ball is
important. In Choice A, when the ball's color which was randomly selected by us is
yellow or pink, the participants obtain the large points (200 points), but when the
color is green, they obtain the low points (100 points). Alternatively, in Choice B, the
role of pink ball is changed, meaning that when the color of the selected ball is pink,
the participants obtain the low points (10 points), rather than the large point as in
Choice A. We explained to the students that after they make their choice, we would
randomly draw one ball to determine their gains, and that the participants can then
exchange their initial session points for gifts. However, we did not tell them what
the gifts were.18 (ii) We conducted some games to measure the students' memory
and vocabulary, using stopwatches and blindfolds.19 (iii) To investigate lifestyle and
18We created our points/gifts exchange system because, under the rules of Hetsugi Junior High
School, we could not reward participants with money.
19In these games, we estimate their degree of overcondence and memory, but omit the results
of these games here because they form the subject of another paper.
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demographics, we asked the students questions about their best subject, monthly
allowance and their school club activities.
(iv) The switching analysis was repeated but in this session each pair of facing
pages in the booklet included another's gain as well as the participant's own gain.20
First, we must note that participants in the rst session obtained points that could
produce income and substitution eects in this nal session. This implies that the
choices of participants in this session may have been aected by points obtained in
the initial session. Therefore, in this session we used a dierent currency, \ruby"
rather than \point" used in the rst session. This removed the income eects from
points gained earlier. We then explained that rubies were to be exchanged for gifts,
but that the gifts presented in exchange for rubies would be dierent from those
exchanged for points.21 In other words, we stressed that the gifts obtained in each
section were not substitutes and that the participants were not allowed to exchange
the gifts from one session with those from the other. We ensured by invigilation that
participants answered the questions in this nal session as seriously as they had in
the initial session. Next, we introduced the concept of another's gain, as presented
in each game's booklet, and explained that this \other" is a transfer student who
would arrive Hetsugi Junior High School the following semester. At this stage, no
student knows anything about the transfer student (e.g., sex or appearance). We
explained that the new transfer student, not yet a member of the school, is to be
given 500 rubies that will be exchanged for gifts. This ensures that participants'
point of reference, dened by the other's gain, is 500 rubies. Finally, we focused on
the timing of switching in the rst and last sessions. As shown in Table 2, the gains
and losses relative to each reference point in the last session are the same as those
20Because we wished to avoid any bias from a learning eect from the initial session, we examined
the degree of ALJ in the nal session, which took place not less than two hours after the conclusion
of the initial session.
21We did not inform participants of the nature of either type of gift. After all the games had
been completed, we sent the participants their gifts according to the numbers of points and rubies
each had obtained.
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in the rst session, which means that the levels of own gain are simply scaled up by
500 rubies in the last session. In theory, we only changed the description, simply
scaling up the numbers, so that participants' choices should not change if the \new
student" with 500 rubies has no eect on participants. This would lead to the same
parameter values in both sessions. If, on the other hand, the timing changed, social
comparison would be seen to have an eect. Figure 3 shows the timing of switching
from the safe option, Choice A, to the risky option, Choice B, where Figure 3a refers
to the initial session and Figure 3b refers to the nal session.
4.2 Analysis
We wish to conrm whether the parameters of preferences with social comparison
dier from those in the original prospect theory. Using the t-test, the null hypothesis
of equality of risk aversion with and without social comparison (H0 :  = ) is
rejected at the 1% level. This implies that the risk attitude is inuenced by the
existence of other people's gains and losses. Similarly, H0 :  = A is rejected at
the 5% level where A is the probability function weight in the original prospect
theory taking no account of the social comparison. The degree of loss aversion is not
statistically dierent from that of ALJ. Using these parameters, Figure 4 shows the
shape of the value functions v() and w() in (2) and (5).
We divide our participants into two groups, based on choice of \best subject",
a question in our additional questionnaire (Table 3). Twenty-ve participants an-
swered that their best subject was physical education (PE=1). From the t-test, it is
evident that the participants who chose physical education are more loss averse than
the others. This result is consistent regardless of the specication of the reference
point. For comparison, we pick those participants whose best subject is science or
mathematics, chosen by thirty-ve students (SciMath=1).22 For participants who
chose mathematics or science, there is no correlation between loss aversion and ALJ.
22We did not restrict participants to choosing a single \best subject"; however, no participants
chose more than one \best subject".
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We also found that participants who chose physical education as their best subject
are more risk averse with social comparison than the others, and those who chose
science or mathematics are more risk loving with social comparison than the others.
Figure 4b shows the value functions v() and w() for groups (PE=0 and PE=1).
For example, the value function v() for PE=1 has the steepest curvature in the loss
domain whose curve is represented by Eq(5)PE in Figure 4.
Next, we examine the eects of physical tness on ALJ, loss aversion and risk
aversion. The correlations between the dierent physical tness variables are given
in Table 4, which conrms a high correlation between some variables. We divide our
data into two groups, data on physical tness and data on variables that are likely
to aect physical tness and whether the chosen best subject is physical education.
Table 5 shows that when the reference point is given by a transfer student's
gain, some physical tness variables aect the preference parameters, but when the
reference point is given by self status quo, these parameters are almost unaected.
For example, columns (1) and (2) show that the greater the strength, the lower the
degree of ALJ, while columns (4){(6) show that the higher the speed, the lower
the degree of risk aversion with social comparison. However, these results are not
observed in the original prospect theory given in columns (3) and (7).
Finally, we analyze the eects of participants' attributes on preferences. To al-
leviate the problem of multicollinearity, Table 6 deals with the individual attributes
that aect physical tness and those such as gender and allowance (Money). The
variable \Club" indicates that participants take part in individual sports represented
by KARATE, JUDO and KENDO or not.23 BMI is obtained from height and weight
data. First, let us conrm the impacts of gender on ALJ and loss aversion. Columns
(1), (2), (5) and (6) indicate that gender has an impact on preferences with social
comparison: girls exhibit a higher degree of ALJ and are more risk averse with so-
cial comparison than boys. Columns (4) and (9) show that gender does not have
an important impact on preferences in the absence of social comparison. Table 6
23Group sports such as soccer and baseball did not almost aect whole preferences.
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concludes that choosing the best subject as physical education (PE) or participation
in an individual sport has some impact on the preference parameters without social
comparison. Columns (3), (4) and (7){(9) show that participants who chose the best
subject as physical education (PE) are more loss averse and more risk averse than
the others. In addition, participants who participate in individual sports are less risk
averse than the others.
5 Further research
5.1 Who respond to voluntary questionnaire?
Whether the preferences of volunteer participants are representative of the popu-
lation is an important topic in the experimental eld because sample selection bias
causes dierences in preferences between voluntary participants and the general pop-
ulation.24 Cleave et al (2011) examine dierences in the social and risk preferences
between the students who attend the laboratory and the general population in the
trust game and the lottery choice game.25 Their main nding is that the social and
risk preferences of volunteer participants do not dier signicantly from those of
the population, concluding that the social and risk preferences of participants are
representative of the population. We note that Cleave et al (2011) do not consider
ALJ.
We are interested in how preferences aect the decision to participation in the
voluntary questionnaire. Hence, we make use of the voluntary responses collected in
May 2010. Table 7 presents our regressions of voluntary participation on preferences.
From Columns (1){(4) in Table 7, it can easily be conrmed that the degree of ALJ
signicantly aects participation in the voluntary questionnaire, showing that the
greater the degree of ALJ, the less likely a participant will choose to respond to the
voluntary questionnaire. It is noted that risk aversion with social comparison does
24See Heckman (1979) and Heckman et al (1998).
25The trust game elicits social preference, while the lottery choice game elicits risk aversion.
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not aect the decision, which is consistent with the results found by Cleave et al
(2011). Furthermore, we can see that loss aversion without social comparison does
not aect the participation decision.
5.2 Transmission from parents to their participant children
When focusing on willingness to take risks and willingness to trust others, Dohmen
et al (2011b) test for transmission of attitudes from parents to children using direct
measures of these attributes for both the children and their parents. They found
that parents' attitudes play a role in shaping their children's attitudes. It is therefore
interesting to incorporate the parents' ALJ. Thus, in March 2011, we sent the same
questions asked in the nal session to our participants' parents so that we could
elicit parents' ALJ preferences.26 We assumed that the reference point is a specic
parent for our participants; however, no parent knew who the reference parent was.
After receiving responses, we sent each respondent a gift certicate of the same cash
value. As with our student participants, we gave the parents no information about
the nature of the gift before receiving their completed questionnaires.
Because responding to our questionnaire was voluntary, only 26 parents did so
where all respondents except one were mothers. We focus on the following two points:
the relation between parents' willingness to participate in the voluntary questionnaire
and their children's preferences, and the dierence in ALJ between students and par-
ents. Because participation and ALJ are closely related, we rst reexamine whether
the voluntary participation of parents is associated with their children's ALJ. Col-
umn (1) in Table 8 shows that children's ALJ is clearly positively associated with
parents' participation with a p value=0.011, meaning that the children are more
ALJ when their parents participate the voluntary questions. Even if individuals' at-
tributes are introduced, Columns (2) and (3) show that the relation between parents'
participation with their children's ALJ is consistent with Column (1). On the other
26We requested that only one parent answer the questions and noted which parent (father or
mother) did so, and asked for a letter of acceptance.
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hand, the remaining children's preferences, given by ,  and , are not related to
their parents' attitudes.
Finally, restricting the analysis to the 26 parents and their respective children, we
examine the dierences in ALJ and risk aversion with social comparison. Denoting
the parents' preferences by the subscript p, our ndings are that the parents have
a greater degree of ALJ and are more risk averse than their children, while the
probability function weight does not dier between children and their parents (Table
9).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper incorporates social comparison into the original prospect theory to exam-
ine the relationship between preferences with social comparison and physical tness.
Our main ndings are as follows. First, we found that participants who chose the
best subject as physical education exhibit a greater degree of ALJ and are more loss
averse than the others. Second, we regressed ALJ and loss aversion with respect to
the physical tness and individual attributes. It appears that some physical tness
inuences the degree of ALJ, whereas it does not inuence the degree of loss aversion.
In addition, we regress these preferences on the individuals' attributes, showing that
gender inuences preferences with social comparison, but does not inuence those
without social comparison.
In addition to our main ndings, we analyzed the relation between voluntary
participation in our questionnaire and individuals' preferences. First, we found that
the preference for ALJ signicantly aects whether participants respond to a vol-
untary questionnaire, showing that participants with a greater degree of ALJ chose
not to participate. However, there is no relationship between other preferences such
as risk aversion and loss aversion and voluntary participation. Second, we examined
the relationship between the voluntary behavior of parents and the preferences of
their children. We found that the voluntary participation of parents was positively
associated with the degree of their children's ALJ.
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Finally, we discuss the existence of multiple reference points. Loss aversion is a
key element in the explanation of the large disparity observed between WTA and
WTP. This large disparity may change with change in own gain position. For ex-
ample, let us consider three familiar individuals who won 50 dollars on the most
recent horse race. Then they would care about the others' gains as well as about
their own. In the next race, suppose that one person loses 50 dollars, whereas the
others win 50 dollars. In this case, what do they care about? Perhaps the loser is
very sensitive as to whether or not his or her own gain is negative, meaning that
his or her reference point is zero own gain{loss. On the other hand, the two people
who won may be sensitive to each other. In that case, their reference point would be
strongly weighted by the other's gain, not at a zero own gain{loss. The situation in
which the gain occurs may determine own reference point. Let us consider another
topic about Japan. After World War II, the level of GDP in Japan was very low,
similar to those in developing countries. It seems that the great dierence in GDP
between Japan and the USA meant that people in Japan were not aware of the level
of GDP in the USA. However, after decades of high economic growth in Japan, the
level of Japan's GDP was second to that of the USA, and the Japanese people be-
came acutely conscious of the USA. In the current period, the level of GDP in China
and Japan is almost the same. Media reports in Japan express great concern about
whether or not the level of GDP in Japan is larger than that in China.
These examples suggest that multiple reference points and their changes are inter-
esting. Following the notation in our paper, for example, we can present an additively
separable value function with two reference points, Z(xijX), as follows:
Z(xijXothers) = W (xi) + (1  )V (xijXothers);
where  is a weight parameter, which would change according to own gain position.
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Figure 2: An example of the choice question
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Figure 4a: Prospect theory with or without social comparison
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Figure 4b: Prospect theory, social comparison and physical education
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Figure 4: Shapes of value functions v() and w()
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Male Female
Hetsugi Japan Hetsugi Japan
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Height (cm) 152.9 8.97 152.7 7.88 150.3 6.14 152.1 6.01
Weight (kg) 43.8 7.59 43.5 8.83 44.8 8.78 43.2 7.63
Power (kg) 25.5 6.22 24.5 6.00 21.9 3.92 21.9 4.27
Sidestep 46.9 6.70 48.2 6.54 39.7 8.23 44.0 5.64
(points)
Run 8.9 1.00 8.4 0.75 9.6 1.14 9.0 0.67
(sec)
Shuttle 70.9 17.45 69.3 21.94 47.0 19.68 50.7 17.61
(number)
Long jump (cm) 172.5 29.75 179.5 23.90 152.5 18.90 162.8 21.12
Ball throw (cm) 17.3 4.68 18.9 4.62 11.6 3.21 12.5 3.59
Sit up (cm) 22.6 5.88 23.7 5.56 20.8 6.66 20.3 5.14
Sit reach (cm) 35.6 7.89 38.7 9.20 41.6 8.12 42.6 9.48
Table 1: The average for Hetsugi Junior High School and all Japan
To compare our participants with the average levels in Japan, we use data from the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan: http://www.mext.go.jp/english/
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The initial session without SC The last session (transfer gain is 500 rubies)
Choice A Choice B Choice A Choice B
Series 1
40% 60% 10% 90% 40% 60% 10% 90%
500 20 900 10 1000 520 1400 510
500 20 950 10 1000 520 1450 510
500 20 1000 10 1000 520 1500 510
500 20 1050 10 1000 520 1550 510
500 20 1120 10 1000 520 1620 510
500 20 1200 10 1000 520 1700 510
500 20 1280 10 1000 520 1780 510
500 20 1360 10 1000 520 1860 510
500 20 1460 10 1000 520 1960 510
500 20 1560 10 1000 520 2060 510
500 20 1680 10 1000 520 2180 510
500 20 1800 10 1000 520 2300 510
500 20 2000 10 1000 520 2500 510
500 20 2300 10 1000 520 2800 510
Series 2
90% 10% 70% 30% 90% 10% 70% 30%
250 150 410 10 750 650 910 510
250 150 420 10 750 650 920 510
250 150 430 10 750 650 930 510
250 150 440 10 750 650 940 510
250 150 450 10 750 650 950 510
250 150 460 10 750 650 960 510
250 150 470 10 750 650 970 510
250 150 480 10 750 650 980 510
250 150 490 10 750 650 990 510
250 150 500 10 750 650 1000 510
250 150 520 10 750 650 1020 510
250 150 540 10 750 650 1040 510
250 150 560 10 750 650 1060 510
250 150 580 10 750 650 1080 510
Series 3
50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
250 -40 300 -200 750 460 800 300
125 -40 300 -200 625 460 800 300
40 -40 300 -200 540 460 800 300
10 -40 300 -200 510 460 800 300
10 -40 300 -140 510 460 800 360
10 -60 300 -140 510 440 800 360
10 -80 300 -140 510 420 800 360
10 -80 300 -120 510 420 800 380
Table 2: Summary of responses to questions (note that we used the booklets as
shown in Figure 6) 32
PE    
Group 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Mean 1.830 2.552 2.026 2.729 0.224 0.231 0.306 0.375
Std. dev 1.665 2.052 1.213 1.551 0.124 0.084 0.102 0.084
p-value 0.074 0.019 0.787 0.003
SciMath
Mean 1.991 2.003 2.323 1.894 0.220 0.236 0.333 0.297
Std. dev 1.657 2.036 1.411 1.073 0.103 0.140 0.099 0.105
p-value 0.974 0.113 0.506 0.080
Obs=85 (PE=0) and Obs=25 (=1), while Obs=75 (Sci & Math=0) and Obs=35 (=1)
Table 3: The relation between preferences and best subject
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) PE 1.00
(2) Speed 0.32 1.00
(3) Quick 0.05 0.37 1.00
(4) Flexibility 0.01 0.04 0.23 1.00
(5) Strength 0.03 0.37 0.16 0.27 1.00
(6) Endurance 0.33 0.50 0.45 0.01 -0.01 1.00
(7) BMI -0.16 -0.29 -0.15 0.15 0.22 -0.32 1.00
Table 4: Correlation of physical tness with variables related to physical tness
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   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Speed 0:225  0:205  0:025  0:027  0:037 0:013
(0:98) ( 1:16) ( 2:09) ( 2:26) ( 2:34) (0:96)
Quick  0:395 0:108  0:009  0:004
( 1:98) (0:71) ( 0:66) ( 0:31)
Flexibility 0:161  0:258 0:020 0:020 0:017
(0:85) ( 0:18) (1:69) (1:50) (1:44)
Strength  0:370  0:334 0:077 0:015  0:022
( 2:17) ( 1:71) (0:51) (1:12) ( 1:83)
Endurance 0:366 0:158 0:018 0:001
(1:70) (0:95) (1:20) (0:06)
Cons 3:154 1:973 1:731 0:289 0:239 0:191 0:315
(5:70) (2:36) (2:70) (8:81) (5:43) (3:36) (6:18)
Obs 109 107 108 108 108 107 107
Table 5: Regression of preferences on physical tness
*, ** and *** indicate that estimated coecients are signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
t-values are given in parentheses.
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   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PE 0:793 0:703 0:762 0:014 0:068 0:071 0:074
(0=NO) (1:92) (2:39) (2:55) (0:49) (3:07) (3:25) (3:19)
Club  0:126  0:409 0:021  0:062  0:066
(0=NO) ( 0:23) ( 1:04) (0:54) ( 2:26) ( 2:18)
BMI  0:006 0:153 0:002 0:004
( 0:07) (2:61) (0:31) (0:84)
Sex 0:716 0:814  0:464 0:045 0:044 0:0003
(0=M) (2:07) (2:26) ( 1:78) (2:02) (1:79) (0:02)
Money  0:0002  0:0001 0:000 0:000
( 1:21) ( 0:85) ( 0:62) (0:72)
Cons 1:728 1:844 2:026  0:581 0:208 0:177 0:306 0:314 0:236
(8:20) (1:19) (14:42) ( 0:52) (15:13) (1:70) (28:95) (28:84) (2:77)
Obs 110 107 110 107 110 107 111 111 108
Table 6: Regression of preferences on individuals' attributes
*, ** and *** indicate that estimated coecients are signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
t-values are given in parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALJ   0:387  0:423  0:425  0:461
( 3:09) ( 3:23) ( 3:15) ( 3:22)
Loss aversion  0:223 0:221 0:174
(1:23) (1:17) (0:92)
Risk aversion   0:570  1:0286
with SC ( 0:30) ( 0:50)
Risk aversion  0:260  0:612
without SC (0:11) ( 0:25)
The weight of  0:442
probability (0:25)
function with SC
The weight of A 0:771
probability ((0:39)
function without SC
PE 0:948
(1:54)
Cons 1:491 1:088 1:139 0:759
(4:40) (2:38) (1:32) (0:49)
Obs 110 110 110 110
Table 7: The relation between voluntary participation and preferences
*, ** and *** indicate that estimated coecients are signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
t-values are given in parentheses.
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   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent 0:943 0:941 1:024  0:028 0:011 0:0244
(0 = NO) (2:59) (2:63) (2:84) ( 0:10) (0:45) (1:15)
PE 0:867
(2:17)
Club  0:188
(0=NO) ( 0:36)
BMI 0:007
(0:09)
Sex 0:713 0:815
(0=M) (2:12) (2:34)
Money  0:0002
( 1:06)
Cons 1:720 1:455 1:276 2:19 0:222 0:315
(8:77) (6:33) (0:85) (14:58) (16:85) (27:51)
Obs 110 110 107 110 110 111
Table 8: The relation between parents' voluntary behavior and the preferences of
their children
*, ** and *** indicate that estimated coecients are signicant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
t-values are given in parentheses.
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 p  p  p
Mean 2.614 3.921 0.221 0.452 0.609 0.578
Std. dev 1.988 2.971 0.116 0.119 0.105 0.148
p-value 0.0695 0.0000 0.2961
Obs=26
Table 9: Dierences in preferences between the participants and their parents
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